Strategic Alliances:

Partnerships for Security and Resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Saturday, February 15^th, 2025

Rolf Schulze Ambassador (ret.)

1.  Preliminary observations

• No authoritative definition of Indo-Pacific; does it include US? does it include China? Different countries opt for different answers. Germany sees China as part of IP but does not include it in its Indo-Pacific Guidelines as China by it sheer size is a case of its own. The US considers itself (quite rightly) a Pacific country and as such as part of IP (“The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation”), but, like China, it is a very specific case. “Indo- Pacific” means different things to different people.

• In general, the term Indo-Pacific has both a geographic and a political connotation.

• In geographic terms, it defines the vast region spanning from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific Island States. It links the contiguous waters of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It comprises South East Asia and ASEAN, South Asia, the African coast of the Indian Ocean, The North Pacific, Oceania.

• In political terms, it is a strategic construct whose focus coincides with the rise of China and the Belt-and-Road Initiative. But it is too broad to be characterized by a single structure. At the contrary, from the Gulf to the Pacific Rim there are multiple subsystems.

• The evolution of the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’ from a term of art in marine biology to a region of contemporary strategic interest has been a key geopolitical development in the past 15 years.

• For the history books: During a 2007 visit to India, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a parliamentary speech introducing the concept of the ‘confluence of the two seas’, emphasising the connectedness of the Pacific and Indian

oceans; subsequently he developed the notion of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’.

• Glass half full and half empty. IP witnesses (i) shifting global and regional dynamics and a strong international focus on Asia: “We are living in the Indo-Pacific era” (MoFA South Korea); (ii) a return of great power rivalry and a high degree of global and regional entropy with the post-Cold War system being more and more questioned; IP becoming the focus of multipolar rivalry.

• All major industrialized and regional countries have summarized their policy goals in an Indo-Pacific Strategy: Germany, France, UK, US, Canada, Japan, South Korea, India etc. as well as EU.

2.  Present-Day Political Scenario

• The Indo-Pacific (IP) area is a key geopolitical space connecting Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia, hosting some of the world’s most critical sea lanes.
• IP includes seven G 20 members: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, The Republic of Korea and South Africa as well as ASEAN states. Altogether it comprises 40 countries.
• China, Japan and the US: the three biggest economies are Pacific nations.

• 20 of 33 mega-cities world-wide are in the Pacific region.

• 60% of the world population live in the Indo-Pacific.

• 60% of global GDP originate in the Indo-Pacific.

• More than half of global CO2 emissions have their origin in the Indo-Pacific.

• Two-thirds of global economic growth originate in IP.

• IP is witnessing increasing strategic competition between major powers, particularly China, the United States, and India, while smaller regional states navigate a complex security environment.
• ASEAN states seek to balance relations with China and the U.S., while smaller island nations (Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros) are increasingly subject to external influence.
• Maritime security concerns include piracy (especially around Somalia), illicit trafficking, and terrorism threats in the region.

3.  Economic and Trade Perspectives

• The Indian Ocean serves as the world’s busiest trade corridor, carrying approximately

80% of global maritime oil trade and 40% of global seaborne trade.

• Key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb (the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gate of Grief or the Gate of Tears, is a strait between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. It connects the Red Sea to

the Gulf of Aden and by extension the Indian Ocean), Malacca Strait (narrow stretch of water, 800 kilometres (500 mi) long and from 65 to 250 km (40–155 mi) wide, between the Malay Peninsula to the northeast and the Indonesian island of Sumatra to the southwest, connecting the Andaman Sea (Indian Ocean) and the South China

Sea (Pacific Ocean).[2] As the main shipping channel between

the Indian and Pacific oceans, it is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world), and Sunda Strait (strait between the Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra. It connects the Java Sea with the Indian Ocean) are crucial for global supply chains.

• China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has significantly expanded infrastructure investment in the region, particularly in ports (Gwadar, Hambantota, Djibouti).
• India, Japan, the EU, and the U.S. seek to counterbalance China’s influence by promoting alternative trade and infrastructure initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
• Key emerging markets (India, Indonesia, Vietnam) drive regional economic growth, while smaller economies (Sri Lanka, Pakistan) struggle with debt distress.
• The European Union remains a major trade partner, emphasizing maritime security, free navigation, and sustainable trade practices.

4.  Great Power Interests in the Indian Ocean

●      China:

• Strategic objective: Dominate regional trade and security through the Maritime Silk Road.
  • Expanding military presence and growing military ambitions: first overseas base in Djibouti; increasing naval patrols; port acquisitions in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar.
  • Seeks control over key sea lanes and energy supply routes, challenging U.S. and Indian dominance.

●      United States:

• Obama (2016): pivot to Asia,
  • Trump (2025): most telephone calls on first working day were with IP leaders.
  • Strategic objective: Ensure freedom of navigation, counter China’s military expansion, and maintain regional alliances.
  • Reallocation of military forces to the region; strengthening military ties with India, Australia, and ASEAN; presence in Diego Garcia and Bahrain.

• Promotion of the Quad Alliance (U.S., India, Japan, Australia) and of AUKUS

to balance China.

●      India:

• China’s growing influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean prompted the Indian government to adopt an Indo-Pacific.
  • In other words: it was China’s perceived intrusion into the Indian Ocean that challenged New Delhi’s strategic interests and that would catalyse India to embrace the idea of a concept for the Indo-Pacific.
  • India is concerned about China’s “String of Pearls” strategy (Chinese-funded ports in neighboring countries).
  • Over the years, India has put its strong support behind the notion of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.
  • The Indo-Pacific concept has provided India with a strategic blueprint for its broader foreign policy agenda. New Delhi’s advocacy of a rules-based regional order, its promotion of economic integration, and efforts to enhance maritime security are a reactive response to a changing world.
  • India has not published a formal Indo-Pacific strategy; however goveret actions and policy statements indicate that the concept has become a key reference point for its strategic outlook.
  • IP concept has various pillars: (i) active participation in regional forums, ‘mini- laterals’, and security dialogues; the US, Japan, Australia and France have arisen as key partners for India in the region; (ii) support of ASEAN centrality in the evolving Indo-Pacific regional architecture, cooperation with groupings such as the Quad, IORA and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).
  • The Quad partnership with the US, Japan and Australia is a key vehicle for India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific. As a political deterrent, it allows India to address concerns vis-à-vis China in partnership with other states.
  • New Delhi sees the Indian Ocean as its natural strategic sphere, launching

SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative.

• Expanding naval capabilities (INS Vikrant, aircraft carrier operations); stronger ties with the U.S., Japan, and ASEAN.
  • India has for a long time been viewed as big, but weak. Today, the Modi government can point to success in accelerating the country’s modernization.

●      European Union:

• Supports multilateral maritime security frameworks and rules-based order in the Indian Ocean.
  • Supports ASEAN centrality.
  • Increasing Indo-Pacific partnerships, including maritime cooperation agreements with India and ASEAN.
  • Investment focus on sustainable connectivity, maritime security, and economic diversification.

5.  Political (in)stability and Conflict Lines

●      Political stability varies across the region:

• South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) remains largely democratic but faces internal political challenges.
  • The Middle East (Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE) plays a growing role in Indian Ocean security, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

●      Risks to stability:

• Ethnic violence in Myanmar.
• Tensions on the India-China and India-Pakistan borders.
• Escalating tensions in the South and East China Seas.
• Tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
• Severe poverty in several countries of the area.
• Four nuclear weapons states with antagonistic relationships.
• The Horn of Africa experiences instability (e.g., Ethiopia, Somalia, Huthi terrorism).
• Asia represents the largest number of people at risk from floods, rising sea levels, and droughts.

●      U.S.-China Rivalry:

• U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) challenge China’s maritime claims.
  • Economic and military containment strategies (AUKUS, QUAD) aim to counter China’s influence.
  • Taiwan’s security remains a major flashpoint.

●      India-China Competition:

• India opposes China’s String of Pearls strategy and military expansion in the Indian Ocean.
  • Growing naval presence in the Andaman Sea; strengthening military alliances with Quad partners.

●      European Union’s Role:

• Prefers a non-confrontational, rule-based approach focused on trade, development, and diplomacy.
  • Supports ASEAN centrality, regional economic resilience, and maritime law enforcement.
  • Increasing military presence and awareness (French and German naval deployments)

• Together, the Indo-Pacific region and Europe account for over 70% of the global trade in goods and services, and over 60% of foreign direct investment flows.
  • The region is the second largest destination of EU exports

6.  Situation in and Around the South China Sea

●      China’s Expansion:

• Militarization of artificial islands; deployment of coast guard and military vessels.
  • Claims nearly 90% of the South China Sea under the Nine-Dash Line, rejected by the 2016 UNCLOS ruling.

●      Regional Resistance:

• Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia contest Chinese claims.
  • Increasing military cooperation between ASEAN states and external powers (U.S., Japan, Australia).

●      EU’s Position:

• Advocates for a rules-based order; supports UNCLOS and ASEAN-led dispute resolution.
  • Increased European naval presence to counter coercion and enforce international law.
  • Supports ASEAN Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

7.  Situation in and Around Taiwan

• China views Taiwan as a core national interest (“One China policy”), escalating military pressure through PLA air incursions and naval drills. Xi Jinping: “Taiwan conflict must be solved during the present generation”.
• The U.S. provides military aid and arms sales to Taiwan; Biden: “strategic unambiguity” on possible intervention; Trump: ambiguity on “strategic ambiguity”.
• India and ASEAN states are cautious, prioritizing regional stability over direct involvement.
• The European Union and its Member States support Taiwan’s democratic status while avoiding diplomatic ties and direct military commitments.
• Any conflict over Taiwan would severely disrupt global semiconductor supply chains

and Indian Ocean trade routes.

8.  German Foreign Policy Towards the Indo-Pacific

• Germany supports a free and open Indo-Pacific, balancing economic engagement with China and strategic cooperation with democratic allies.

• Indo-Pacific Guidelines (2020): turning point in German Asia policy, new German focus on Asia, witness high-level German visits to the region since 2020: 15 different countries: Federal President, Chancellor, various Ministers.
• Defense and security cooperation: most notable development, witness 2023 visit of German Minister of Defense to Singapore and in 2024 to South Korea and the Philippines; participation of German Defense Forces in maneuvers in Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and Japan as well as in RIMPAC.
• German Air Force: participation in Arctic Defender; Nippon Skies; Tarang Shakti

(India).

• Key pillars of German IP-policy

• Maritime security: Increased naval deployments (e.g., Bayern frigate, planned Indo-Pacific naval missions).
  • Trade diversification: Reducing dependence on China through stronger ties with ASEAN, India, Australia (“China plus one”).
  • Climate and sustainability: Green partnerships with Indian Ocean states (e.g., renewable energy investments in Indonesia, India).

• Pro-active German multilateral policy: Signatory of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; Development Partner of ASEAN; member of Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM); support to Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF); Dialogue Partner of Pacific Island Forum (PIF); co-operation with Mekong River Commission (MRC); shareholder of Asia Development Bank (ADB); shareholder of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); dialogue partner of Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA); strong German support for active EU role in East Asia Summit (EAS).
• Pro-active EU multilateral policy: i.a.: observer status ADAM+ (ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting); member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
• Asia Pacific Conferene (APC) of German Business Association.

9.  Assessment of German „Indo-Pacific Guidelines“

●      Positive Aspects:

• Germany has increased its Indo-Pacific engagement, aligning with EU Indo- Pacific strategy.
  • Important trading partner of all countries of IP.
  • Strong focus on multilateralism, economic stability, and climate cooperation.
  • Naval deployments signal Germany’s commitment to regional security and rules-based order.

●      Challenges and Limitations:

• Balancing economic interests with China while strengthening Indo-Pacific partnerships remains difficult.
  • Need for a more comprehensive, long-term Indo-Pacific security policy

beyond trade and sustainability.

• Limited FDI in IP in comparison with other industrialized countries.

Conclusion

• The Indo-Pacific area is a geopolitical focal point, with intensifying strategic competition among global powers.
• Germany and the EU must and can play a more proactive role in shaping the region’s

maritime security, trade policies, and multilateral governance.

• Germany and the EU are on the right track.
• Strengthening Indo-Pacific partnerships, ensuring supply chain resilience, and upholding a rules-based order are key priorities for Germany’s future Indo-Pacific engagement.